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Abstract
Hungary and Poland are often placed in the same analytical framework from the 
period of their ‘negotiated revolutions’ to their autocratic turn. This article aims to 
look behind this apparent similarity focusing on opposition behaviour. The analysis 
demonstrates that the executive–parliament power structure, the vigour of the extra-
parliamentary actors, and the opposition party frame have the strongest influence on 
opposition behaviour, and they provide the sources of difference between the two 
country cases: in Hungary an enforced power game and in Poland a political game 
constrain opposition opportunities and opposition strategic behaviour.
Keywords Autocratisation · Extra-parliamentary arena · Hungary · Opposition · 
Parliament · Party system · Poland
Introduction
What can this study add?
Hungary and Poland are often packed together in political analyses on the grounds 
that they constitute cases of democratic decline. The parties in governments appear 
infamous on the international, particularly on the EU, scene. Fidesz1 in Hungary 
has been on the verge of leaving or being forced to leave the People’s Party group 
due to repeated abuses of democratic norms, and PiS in Poland2 is a member of 
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the European Reformists and Conservatives EU party group. Both regimes represent 
cases of democratic decline (Maerz et al. 2020). The life of opposition is rarely easy 
as executives tend to dominate the parliamentary agenda, and particularly difficult 
when the governing forces represent a new political–strategic rationale as opposed 
to their antecedents.
At first glance, the similarity of the political processes in Hungary and Poland is 
well grounded in data; both in Hungary and in Poland the process of autocratisation 
is taking place (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). The curves of the electoral democ-
racy index (EDI)3 look quite similar: in Hungary EDI began to decline in 2010 and 
in Poland in 2015 when Fidesz and PiS came to power, respectively (Fig. 1). It is 
therefore reasonable to suppose that the deterioration of indicators is related to new 
governments in these countries. In fact, this marks the starting point for our com-
parative analysis.
The article aims to add to existing research in three respects. First, by compar-
ing the opposition behaviour in the two countries we provide a dynamic picture that 
helps explain the causes, the adaptation processes as well as the differences and 
similarities of opposition behaviour. Our expectation is that despite the apparent 
Fig. 1  Electoral democracy index (EDI) for Hungary and Poland 2000–2019. Data source: Coppedge 
et al. (2020)
3 See Coppedge et al. (2020). The EDI runs on a continuous scale from 0 to 1, with higher values indi-
cating a more democratic dispensation. We operationalise autocratisation as a substantial decline on the 
EDI (within one year or over a connected time period). A decline is substantial if it amounts to drop of 
0.1 or more on the EDI. A typical example would be the series of declines in democratic qualities in 
Hungary from 2006 to 2017 adding up to drop of the EDI of 0.11.
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similarity between the two cases the patterns of government–opposition relations 
are far from identical (Bustikova and Guasti 2017). Second, by exceeding broad 
generalisations that prevail regarding the two countries that are too often placed in 
the same box we shall explore substantive features of the two cases focusing on the 
behaviour of opposition.4 Lastly, as most opposition studies on non-democracies 
tend to focus on long-existing non-democratic regimes (Gandhi and Przeworski 
2006; Loidolt and Mecham 2016; Gandhi et al. 2020) Hungary and Poland offer an 
important complementary perspective as they had experienced apparently successful 
democratisation with a well-working government–opposition power structure. Spe-
cifically, we enquire whether the opposition in these two post-communist countries 
has similar or different functions than in long-standing established autocracies?
Opposition in context—varied expectations
Both Fidesz and PiS experienced eight years in parliament as main opposition par-
ties when they acquired government power. In Hungary, our analysis will cover the 
2010–2020 decade, i.e. the three Orbán governments (2010–2014, 2014–2018, and 
the ongoing 2018–term). Fidesz, together with its small satellite party ally (Chris-
tian Democrats, KDNP), enjoys a two-thirds supermajority in parliament, allowing 
them uninhibited constitutional and legislative action—which, indeed, they have 
widely used. These governments are usually regarded as coalitions. The status of the 
minor party is, however, questionable: they run an electoral alliance with Fidesz and 
form a party alliance with them (even dual-party membership is allowed). However, 
in parliament both parties operate independent parliamentary party groups (PPGs), 
but mainly to secure a maximum of parliamentary resources. In political and policy 
terms, the KDNP is hardly visible.
For Poland, the time frame of the analysis is shorter. The 2015 PiS government 
was the first one after 1989 that enjoyed a one-party majority and faced a president 
from the same party. However, under the formal one-party label, PiS hosted two 
other small parties: the radical–conservative Solidarity Poland (SP) and liberal–con-
servative Porozumienie. These parties campaigned on ‘one-party’ lists and later 
formed a ‘one-party’ PPG. After the parliamentary election in 2019, the one-party 
majority of PiS has been retained, albeit with more intra-party competition as both 
satellite parties increased their share. At the same 2019 parliamentary elections, PiS 
lost their majority in the Senate, which marked an unprecedented change as both 
chambers used to have identical political composition before. Although the Senate 
is a weak institution, it has 30 days to take a position on a bill, which is an important 
asset in times of exceptionally accelerated legislation. Also, the Speaker of the Sen-
ate (now from the opposition) enjoys a major public standing.
4 A rare and welcome exception is Csehi and Zugt (2020). They do not only argue for the presence of 
differences in the two countries’ Eurosceptic populism but the government–opposition power structure is 
one of the explanatory factors in their analysis, as well.
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In addition to the government–parliament focus, two further aspects are para-
mount for the government–opposition power structure, civil society and the media. 
In Hungary, civil society actors tend to be sceptical towards parties, party–civil 
society cooperation remains sporadic, and until 2018 parties were not welcome at 
civil society demonstrations. Moreover, as early as 2017, the executive introduced 
legislation against civil society actors in Hungary. By contrast, in Poland a vivid 
civil society prevails; citizen response to political events is common and not limited 
to Warsaw. Political parties join street protests, using them as a non-parliamentary 
instrument of opposition to the government. The Civil Society Participation Index 
(Fig. 2) shows that during the period of communism civil society in Hungary was 
even stronger than in Poland, but this changed after the establishment of the Solidar-
ity trade union, and then after a short reversal has persisted ever since.
In Hungary, free public media do not exist. According to estimations, the Fidesz 
media empire constitutes 77.8% of the media market (Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely 
2019). In Poland, public broadcasters are politically controlled by the parliamen-
tary majority, but the private sector is much stronger and mostly explicitly liberal. 
Although since 2015 PiS has been repeatedly announcing the ‘re-polonisation’ of 
the private media by forcing the inclusion of a larger share of Polish capital or by 
market deconcentration, nothing like this happened (Palczewski 2018) until Decem-
ber 2020 when a state-owned company bought a local media group from a German 
owner. The group controls 20 out of 24 regional titles and 120 local newspapers, 
along with over 17 million monthly users of their websites (Shotter 2020). Even 
earlier, after 2015, when laws related to the prevention of terrorist attacks came into 
Fig. 2  Civil society participation in Hungary and in Poland 1945–2019. Data source: Coppedge et  al. 
(2020)
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force, new provisions have allowed for greater control of content on the Internet. 
Moreover, both in Poland and Hungary journalists tend to face limitations regard-
ing access to and working in parliament. Overall, though, freedom of expression 
and access to alternative sources of information, as well as civil society, are still 
in a reasonably good condition in Poland—certainly much more so than in Hun-
gary. According to the data from some recent research conducted at the University 
of Warsaw,5 freedom of speech was valued the fourth highest out of 22 evaluated 
policy fields (6.9 on an 11-point scale from 0 = state works badly to 10 = state works 
well). These different civic and media environments form part of the larger political 
opportunity structure of the opposition.
Table 1 shows a more complete comparative overview of the most important vari-
ables that can shape opposition behaviour. Some of these factors are systemic (con-
stitutional), such as the political position of the president, the structure of the parlia-
ment or the electoral system, while others may change over time and thus constitute 
a temporary configuration, such as party complexion and format of the government 
or media control by the government.
In the following sections, we focus on both parliamentary and extra-parliamen-
tary opposition behaviour. Given the differences between our two countries regard-
ing the power of civil society and the connection between high politics and low 
politics’ actors, we expect to find variation in frequency, strength and the impact 
of extra-parliamentary opposition action. There is a growing understanding in the 
international literature that opposition cannot be equated with parliamentary party 
opposition only. Given the differences between Hungary and Poland in terms of the 
power of civil society, the question remains whether the historical difference per-
sists in hard times when the democratic credentials of the system are under threat? 
The potentially persistent or changing inter-country difference is related to the intra-
country developments: will the tendency towards autocratisation change the interac-
tion between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition?
Moreover, we expect behavioural differences due to the differences in the com-
position of opposition in two respects, one regarding the structure of the opposition 
and the other regarding the ideological–political position of individual opposition 
parties. As to the first, Table 2 shows the share of opposition parties by party fam-
ily in the two countries. For Hungary the three figures in each cell indicate that the 
observation period covers three parliamentary terms, while for Poland the two fig-
ures show that the observation period is two terms. The annotation shows the party 
composition of the respective party families.
A mere glimpse at Table 2 reveals that the Hungarian opposition scene is more 
polarised, making any potential opposition cooperation difficult. Moreover, due to 
the absence of a dominant party among them, opposition parties would be more 
competitive striving for the ‘top’ position. The Polish opposition scene is consider-
ably more diverse and more flexible as compared to the apparently rigid Hungarian 
one. It is also skewed to the left-liberal side. Still, importantly, all opposition PPGs 
in the Sejm share their criticism of PiS policy and constitute an alternative (party or 
5 Ongoing project ‘Political system in action’, led by A. Dudzińska, unpublished research.
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coalition of parties) to the populist government, for which there is no equivalent in 
Hungary. In addition to the structure of the opposition, the individual parties’ politi-
cal–ideological positions might also play a role in their behaviour as these will influ-
ence the strategies of the individual parties. For example, it might seem a reward-
ing and attractive strategy for some parties to cooperate with or at least offer some 
cooperation to the governing party in the hope of future posts. For others, either due 
to their former political or current ideological position this is not an option. Thus, 
opposition parties are invariably committed to overcoming the regime.
The changing behaviour of the opposition
In both countries, the opposition faced powerful government legislative action from 
the very beginning. In Hungary, the two-thirds majority and in Poland the unprec-
edented institutional concentration of one-party power were important triggers in 
this regard. The Sejm was like a voting machine (Dudzińska 2016). In Hungary, the 
number of bills accepted in 2010–2014 was more than twice as high as during the 
first democratic term (1990–1994) when the process of systemic change had to be 
managed (Ilonszki and Vajda 2021). However, anti-government parties may use dif-
ferent strategies. In Poland, three months after the election the PO’s leader declared: 
‘We will be the total opposition, the hardest possible’ and the party boycotted nego-
tiations with the ruling party (Szczerbiak 2017), while the liberal Modern declared 
several times it would be open to discuss matters with PiS. The differences between 
opposition parties were pronounced in Hungary—at least in the first years of the 
populist government. First, Jobbik tried to build up cooperative strategies and initi-
ated policies that also fit the governing party’s political and policy views. Neverthe-
less, Fidesz did not need Jobbik as it had a safe majority position in parliament. 
Moreover, Fidesz did not want to replace its ‘invisible’ coalition partner KDNP with 
Jobbik, which had its own political and policy identity. Besides, Fidesz and Job-
bik targeted the same constituency; thus, they appeared to be rivals on the electoral 
Table 2  Share of opposition party families during the observation periods (at the beginning of each term)
Hungary—left: 2010, and 2014 MSzP (Socialists), 2018: MSzP, DK (Democratic Coalition), P (Dia-
logue); green: LMP (Politics Can Be Different); radical right: Jobbik (For a Better Hungary)
Poland—left 2019: Left (coalition of Together, Democratic Left Alliance and Spring), green: 2019 the 
Green Party run from joint lists with PO and belongs to KO PPG, liberal: 2015 PO (Civic Platform), 
N (Modern), 2019: KO (Civic Coalition: PO, N, Polish Initiative, Greens), agrarian 2015: PSL (Polish 
Peasants Party), 2019: Polish Coalition (PSL, Kukiz’15), right: 2015 Kukiz15, 2019 Konfederacja (Con-
federation)
Party family/country Share of opposition (%)
Left Green Liberal Agrarian Right
Hungary 15.3; 14.6; 17.3 4.1; 2.5; 4.5 – – 12.2; 11.6; 13.1
Poland 0; 10.7 0; 0 36.1; 29.1 3.5; 6.5 9.1, 2.4
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scene. Within just a few years, Jobbik has made a strategic turn towards the centre 
and the opposition parties became fully united in an anti-government stance.
In both countries, the opposition was active both at the level of legislation and 
parliamentary scrutiny. In Poland, due to the more flexible party framework joint 
legislative initiatives were common (i.e. around seven percent), while in Hun-
gary there was just one single joint opposition legislative initiative—not surpris-
ingly given the polarised opposition scene—during the first parliamentary term 
(2010–2014), that between Socialists (MSzP) and the Greens (LMP). In a way 
this increased legislative activity is paradoxical as opposition legislative initiatives 
are virtually never accepted in Hungary (Várnagy and Ilonszki 2018). In contrast, 
5.5% of opposition bills were enacted in Poland in 2015–2019.6 The former gov-
erning party PO in Poland has shown less intense activity than the other opposi-
tion groups—confirming the academic knowledge that senior opposition parties that 
expect to return to the government benches challenge the government either with 
legislative action or scrutiny less frequently than smaller or permanent opposition 
parties (De Giorgi and Ilonszki 2018: 236). This, however, does not hold for the 
Socialists in Hungary, who had been the senior governing party and the rival of 
Fidesz. The difference can be explained by the relatively strong position of the Civic 
Platform as a challenger in Poland, while the Hungarian MSzP gets ailing. We can 
also observe major differences in using scrutiny measures. For example, interpel-
lations are used much more frequently in Poland than in Hungary. In Poland inter-
pellations are structurally encouraged by the preferential list vote system, that puts 
individual MPs more into focus, while in Hungary they are discouraged by the pos-
sibility of abusing interpellations by the government parties.7 This shows the power 
of extra-parliamentary (electoral system) and intra-parliamentary regulations (stand-
ing orders) at the same time.
Clearly, the differences in standing rules, and how they are used or abused, also 
explain opposition action. In Hungary, the standing rules must be accepted by a 
two-thirds majority. Paradoxically, the two-thirds requirement was introduced at 
the democratic transition as a safety measure in defence of minority—now it serves 
supermajority interests. A series of standing order reforms substantially transformed 
parliamentary procedures in the past decade. This included the curtailing of oppo-
sition and speaking rights; the rules to establish investigation committees (once 
being the right of one-fifth of MPs now being made dependent on the will of the 
parliamentary majority); and an increase in the disciplinary powers of the Speaker. 
Such institutional changes alone do not tell the whole story, though. From a politi-
cal perspective, the intention is more obvious: the governing party prepares for the 
long term—should they lose their two-thirds majority their predominant positions 
in parliament will remain. While in Hungary the standing rules have been substan-
tially modified to the detriment of the opposition, in Poland they have remained 
largely unchanged, although they actually can be changed by a simple majority. The 
7 In Hungary, governing parties use interpellations excessively, and their interpellations get publicity on 
the floor in higher share than opposition interpellations (Ilonszki and Vajda 2021).
6 Official data of the Chancellery of Sejm.
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amendments of 2018 that gave the Marshal (Speaker) the right to consider whether a 
deputy’s statement or behaviour would ‘violate the seriousness’ of the Sejm or vio-
late peace and order in the area managed by the Chancellery of the Sejm and to raise 
financial penalties on that basis, marked the only significant changes since 2015.
The disciplinary powers of the Speaker, such as financial penalty against MPs 
or their exclusion from parliamentary sessions, increased considerably in Hungary 
as well. While in Poland one single case was publicised, in Hungary financial pen-
alty against MPs was applied in 22 cases between 2014 and 2018 and in 45 cases 
between 2018 and 2020. MPs were excluded from parliamentary sessions in three 
cases in the 2014–2018 parliamentary term and in eight cases since 2018 as a disci-
plinary measure. These disciplinary regulations in Hungary have not halted opposi-
tion action. Rather, they have elicited public response in the form of private dona-
tions from citizens to cover penalties. Difference between opposition parties in terms 
of ‘undisciplined’ behaviour has also prevailed: small parties, and individual MPs 
without a party or PPG background are less disciplined. It is difficult to judge the 
consequences: they have gained public visibility and media coverage—at least in the 
remaining very few independent media—while they have remained disconnected to 
democratic parties. This seems to have changed, as of lately: as a fully united oppo-
sition strategy is being formed for the 2022 parliamentary elections, these independ-
ent MPs might become precious assets for the more ‘disciplined’ opposition parties.
Despite the apparently different government trajectories, the pressure on the 
opposition in both countries is obvious in at least two important respects: at the level 
of the legislative process and regarding disciplinary measures. Although these pres-
sures have been much harsher in Hungary than in Poland, fully fledged opposition 
action has emerged quicker in Poland than in Hungary—both in parliament and in 
the street.
In Poland, the opposition turned to civil society early on. Social movements and 
organisations began to protest immediately after the first legislative decisions of PiS. 
The leaders of PiS labelled new opposition’s activities outside the parliament ‘ulica i 
zagranica’ (‘streets and abroad’), words that ironically referred to a speech of a com-
munist party leader from 1968 addressing activities of the anti-communist opposi-
tion. The strongest street protests, supported by the opposition, concerned three laws 
that would affect the court system. Social pressure prompted the president to veto 
two of them. Two other contested projects related to abortion, which sparked a wave 
of feminist and leftist demonstrations. As a result, neither of these laws was enacted.
In addition, the activities of the opposition in the Sejm extended beyond legisla-
tion and ‘normal’ parliamentary work. They frequently resorted to filibuster (e.g. 
prolongation of parliamentary debates by multiple speakers or hundreds of amend-
ments) or occupied the pulpit, especially in the first years. A radical novelty was 
that the opposition occupied the plenary hall from 16 December 2016 to 12 January 
2017, in reaction to an attempt to change the organisation of the work of journalists 
in the Sejm and the exclusion of an opposition MP from the plenary. Street protests 
supported the parliamentary opposition. Both the former rules of journalists’ work 
in the Sejm and the MP’s participation in the plenary were restored.
The space and place of the dynamics of opposition action was different in Hun-
gary. Initially, the parliamentary opposition was overwhelmed by the parliamentary 
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activities, and the first large civic movements for the freedom of media and for free-
dom of education did not expect and did not aim for any party support. It became 
obvious, however, by the second term that the classic parliamentary tools would be 
insufficient for the opposition (Várnagy and Ilonszki 2018). The conflicts culmi-
nated in 2018, when the government introduced a new labour law. In parliament, the 
opposition parties tried to filibuster and boycott the vote, and on the street different 
civic groups and political parties organised joint demonstrations. This was the first 
occasion that Jobbik and Socialist sympathisers were marching together in Buda-
pest listening to speakers from highly different backgrounds. These demonstrations 
spread to other cities as well. Opposition parties increasingly sought to find extra-
parliamentary ways in face of the frail parliamentary opportunities. There has been 
increasing cooperation between the opposition groups in parliament favoured by a 
decreasing level of party polarisation (for example, opposition parties initiated sev-
eral investigation committees together, though with rather limited impact).
Learning cooperative strategies eventually brought about some opposition suc-
cess both in Hungary and Poland. In Poland, at the 2018 local elections PO and 
Modern created the Civic Coalition to increase their chances. Later, informal coali-
tions at the 2019 parliamentary elections and common candidates in each of the 100 
FPTP Senate districts improved the status of the opposition. In Hungary, at the 2019 
local elections Budapest and several other major cities fell to the opposition—also 
based on joint opposition efforts or/and the inclusion of civic actors.
The new power structure facilitated opposition to take advantage of more institution-
alised and thus more effective forms of activity instead of violent protests in Poland, 
while in Hungary conflicts further intensified. Two examples might be illustrative: In 
Poland, MPs with the help of their mandate can and effectively do acquire information 
and thus exercise control over state administration, local governments and state-owned 
companies. In contrast, in Hungary when opposition party MPs wanted to read out their 
proclamation in the public television and thus inform the people that public television 
does not provide reliable information, they were thrown out of the building and some 
beaten up by security guards. The Public Prosecutor claimed that security guards only 
performed their duty. The case now is at the European Court of Justice.
In Poland, it is also possible for the opposition to use direct presidential elec-
tions as a lever for success in parliamentary elections, provided there is a favourable 
sequence of terms. PiS took this opportunity when it came to power in 2015, largely 
thanks to the result of the presidential election a few months earlier.
The context of the pandemic only confirms the former analysis. In Hungary, the 
regime became harsher both in parliament and outside. The crisis provided argu-
ments to implement steps against local governments where the opposition acquired 
majority position. The introduction of decree governing raised serious concerns 
given that the government implemented this without a sunset clause. Also in Poland, 
the COVID-19 pandemic has confirmed the need for a strong state and thus strength-
ened the government. PiS wanted to capitalise on this by sticking to the scheduled 
presidential election day in May 2020. Ultimately, they failed. The joint efforts 
including the Senate, local governments, NGOs, media and even one of the intra-PiS 
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satellites,8 eventually inhibited the presidential election to be held under changed 
and non-transparent rules and conditions. Finally, the Left organised a roundtable on 
the presidential election with the participation of all PPGs to agree on a new com-
promise law so that it could be smoothly passed in parliament (Polish Press Agency 
2020). This was an exceptional meeting in recent years.
Conclusions
Our starting point was that in our two countries different opportunity structures and 
constraints would likely give rise to different opposition behaviour. This has been 
broadly confirmed by our analysis. The executive in Poland was unable to pursue some 
of its proposed steps against the opposition ‘infrastructure’, like the full transformation 
of the media or the court system, due to its less stable position as opposed to Hungary 
where the executive plays the ‘game of attack on the entire field’—to quote the Prime 
Minister, a devoted football fan. Some of the opposition’s behavioural differences can-
not be explained by mere institutional variation, however. Rather, institutional oppor-
tunities and the opposition party framework as well as the individual party strategies 
all combine in shaping opposition behaviour in the two countries.
The number of actors and their cooperation potential can be identified as impor-
tant explanatory factors in this regard. Thus, while it is reasonable to conclude that 
government action affects opposition action, the connection is not necessarily imme-
diate or straightforward. Blondel’s argument (Blondel 1997) on the parasitic nature 
of opposition can be applied to our cases with some qualification: the impact of the 
government on opposition behaviour has been largely shaped by the composition of 
the opposition party frame and features of civil society. Rigid party lines, a higher 
level of party polarisation and the presence of genuinely new parties have inhibited 
or at least delayed opposition moves against excessive executive action in Hungary.
As for the differential engagement of civil society, it is not only their historical 
differences that matter but also more recent patterns of party and civil society rela-
tions. There have been striking time-related differences in the otherwise conspicu-
ously parallel dynamics: fast reaction of the opposition in Poland and slow adapta-
tion to the context in Hungary. Nevertheless, the closer a country proceeds on the 
line of autocratisation, the more the role of non-parliamentary opposition is on the 
increase: in Hungary, the increasing rigidity of government forces has melted the icy 
connections between intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition.
Despite these substantial differences, we have also identified some similar tra-
jectories of opposition behaviour. In both countries, the opposition has used extra-
parliamentary means (although more frequently and more systematically in Poland 
than in Hungary); they increasingly have resorted to more robust intra-parliamentary 
8 Porozumienie at least temporarily turned into a veto player. Gowin, then deputy Prime Minister, pub-
licly questioned the feasibility of holding the election on 10 May as planned by PiS and resigned from his 
position in government. Five MPs from the party voted against or abstained.
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activities, such as boycott and filibuster; and not least they developed common strat-
egies for concerted oppositional action.
The analysis of opposition behaviour has also helped us to detect important aspects 
of the two regimes. After 1989, both countries adapted democracy as a political sys-
tem and capitalism as an economic system. Their transformation largely followed the 
model of Western liberal democracy. The analysis of a longer trend of indicators may 
suggest that we are facing a downward correction of the liberal component. Never-
theless, the recent experiences in Poland demonstrate that several opportunities are 
available for the opposition to constrain the abuse of power by government. One can 
reasonably expect that the recent EDI decline could be stopped or reduced. In contrast, 
the opposition opportunities and democratic revival remain bleak in Hungary.
When it comes to opposition opportunities, our conclusion is different for the two 
countries. As specified in the introductory essay of the Symposium, ‘the strategic 
goal of governments in electoral autocracies cannot be reasonably reduced to sim-
ply banning any political oppositions altogether’ (see Helms in this issue). Indeed, 
in other non-democratic cases even dictators make concessions to the opposition in 
terms of policies, even though, ultimately, the outcome of the concessions is arbi-
trary (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Thus, the opposition gets some benefit and 
might enjoy some rent seeking in an authoritarian legislature above and exceeding 
its genuine interest, namely to maintain its visibility for the next round of elections. 
This seems to be a possible trend in Poland, where the opposition not only ‘demon-
strates’ the presence of multiparty democracy, but also serves the government as a 
convenient whipping boy who can be blamed for any government errors. In addition, 
both sides, government and opposition, seem to profit from extreme political polari-
sation. By contrast, we cannot see anything like this in Hungary. The opposition is 
extremely vulnerable and kept only for legitimacy reasons.
In any regime, the actual implementation of the ideal of polyarchy, including free 
access to information, freedom of speech and freedom of association, depends both on 
the strength of governments and—much more so—on the strength of oppositions. Again 
major differences between our two cases stand out: in Poland, we witness a political 
game between government and opposition—even, if arguably this game is more brutal 
than normal for established democracies. In contrast, in Hungary we witness an enforced 
power game dominated by the executive leaving hardly any terrain for opposition action.
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